| 基于演化博弈的事业单位绩效工资研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 杨远健,杨桂元. 基于演化博弈的事业单位绩效工资研究[J]. 科技和产业, 2014, 0(2): 123-125 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 杨远健 杨桂元 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 安徽财经大学 数量经济研究所, 安徽 蚌埠 233030;安徽财经大学 数量经济研究所, 安徽 蚌埠 233030 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 传统博弈论基于“理性人”的假设,对有些现象和问题没有很好的解释。本文运用了演化博弈方法对事业单位绩效工资进行了研究,基于“有限理性”建立了复制动态方程,并分析计算出演化稳定策略,最终得出事业单位的绩效工资应在怎样的机制和环境下才能达到其预期的目的。
|
| 关 键 词： | 演化博弈 事业单位 绩效工资 |
Research on Institutions Incentive Pay for Performance Based on Evolutionary Game |
| |
| Abstract: | The traditional game theory based on the rational man hypothesis, for some phenomena and the problem is not well explained, the paper made a study on institution incentive pay using evolutionary game theory, based on the bounded rationality to establish a replication of dynamic equations, calculate and analyze the evolutionary stable strategy, conclude pay for performance should under what a mechanism and environment in order to achieve its intended purpose. |
| |
| Keywords: | evolutionary game institutions performance pay |
|
| 点击此处可从《科技和产业》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《科技和产业》下载全文 |
|
