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跨国公司与东道国关系制度分析
引用本文:洪涌. 跨国公司与东道国关系制度分析[J]. 商业研究, 2003, 3(23): 27-29
作者姓名:洪涌
作者单位:南开大学国际经济研究所,天津,300071
摘    要:跨国公司与东道国之间的博弈结果是双方受益,因而是一种“正和博弈”。东道国的FDI制度以及跨国公司FDI制度都是这种博弈的均衡结果,通过内生博弈规则和外生规则内部化而完成了作为整体的FDI制度的自我维系过程。由于信息的不对称和国家的多重悖论,加剧了博弈的复杂性,因而形成了动态的、连续的多阶段均衡,其外在表现就是FDI输入既有连续性、规律性,又有波动性、不确定性。

关 键 词:跨国公司  东道国  博弈均衡  制度
文章编号:1001-148x(2003)23-0027-03
修稿时间:2003-01-20

An Institutional Analysis of the Relationship Between TNCs and Host Country
Abstract:The rapid growth of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) has created games with the host countries. It is a positive-sum game because of double-win returns. The results of the game get the FDI institution of the host country and the FDI institution of TNCs into shape. With endogenous game rules and intemalization of exogenous rules, the unitary FDI system has completed its self-fulfilling process. The asymmetrical information and paradox of the state intensify the complexity of the game, as a result, engender dynamic, successive multi-phases equilibrium with the exterior representation of FDI input with succession, reqularity, fluctuation and uncertainty.
Keywords:TNCs   host country    equilibrium of Game    institution
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