基于农产品质量安全的技术扩散博弈分析

在有限理性的假设下,本文采用演化博弈论方法,分析了生产者之间、生产者和消费者之间以及生产者和政府监管部门之间相互作用时的策略选择行为,揭示出经济利益是影响质量安全技术扩散的主要内在因素。因此,若要遏制不安全技术行为的发生,一是要减少生产者的违规收益,严厉处罚并提高其生产成本;二是引导消费者增加对安全农产品的需求;三是加强对监管者的再规制,提高其监测能力、监管频率等。

Game Analysis on Technology Spread Based on Agro-products Quality and Safety

Under the hypothesis that producers,consumers,regulators and other major participants are under bounded rationality,this paper an alyzes the strategy selections by using the method of evolutionary game theory when a producer interacts with other producers,consumers,and governmental regulators, and reveals that economic benefits is a main internal factor influencing technology diffusion of quality and safety. Finally, it suggests that, in order to restrain the behaviors of unsafe technologies, producers＇ illegal incomes should be cut down, and pro- duction costs should be increased,and consumers＇ demands for safe agricultural products should be guided and increased, and re regulating the regulators should be strenthened strictly, and regulation frequency and supervision abilities should be improved.