政府拨款博弈中拖延和等靠行为：一个模型分析

文章构造了一个上级政府和下级政府之间的拨款博弈模型来解释观察到的拨款博弈现象。模型表明上级任期和下级类型（财力状况）分布的不同组合,会导致存在拖延和等靠的分离均衡、几乎没有拖延的混同均衡,以及富足下级伪装财力困难而上级随机拨款的半分离均衡;而下级项目的投资效益是影响拨款进度的关键因素。与那些将“拖延”和“等靠”归结为上级工作效率低下的传统观点不同,本文表明,对于一个追求效率的上级,拖延行为也可能因信息不对称而发生。

Delay and Wait Behaviors in Game of Funds Appropriating: A Model Analysis

A game model of funds appropriating is created in the paper to explain the phenomenon observed in governments' funds appropriating. The model shows: separate equilibrium in which delay and wait are separated, pooled equilibrium in which delay and wait are pooled, and semi-separate equilibrium in which the rich subordinate will pretend to be poor subordinate, will be elicited by different combination of tenure length of superior and types of subordinate. Different from the traditional literatures that owe the "delay" and "wait" to the low efficiency of superior, this paper shows the delay and wait behaviors can still exist when the superior pursues efficient while the information on types of subordinate is asymmetric.