Evolution in games with a continuous action space |
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Authors: | Matthijs van Veelen Peter Spreij |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands;(2) Korteweg-de Vries Institute for Mathematics, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Plantage Muidergracht 24, 1018 TV Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the existence of a uniform invasion
barrier, local superiority and asymptotic stability relate to each other. This is done without restricting the populations
of which we want to investigate the stability to monomorphic population states or to strategies with finite support.
The authors have benefitted from careful and precise comments by Gerard van der Laan, Jan van Mill, the editor and an anonymous
referee. Matthijs van Veelen gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Netherlands’ Organization for Scientific Research
(NWO). |
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Keywords: | Evolutionary stability Uniform invasion barrier Local superiority Asymptotic stability Continuous action space Topology |
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