Non-cooperative Households and the Size and Composition of Public Expenditure |
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Authors: | Dan Anderberg Alessandro Balestrino |
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Institution: | (1) CESifo, CEPR and IFS, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK;(2) University of Pisa and CESifo, Pisa, Italy |
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Abstract: | This paper presents a model in which the composition and size of public spending are determined through a political process. Agents differ in wage rates, and live in households positively sorted by wage; household production benefits both partners but the partners interact non-cooperatively, hence the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient. There are three policy tools, a labour income tax rate, a cash transfer and an in-kind transfer. The latter can be combined with household production to generate a household public good. All agents agree on some form of public intervention to remedy the inefficiency, but low-wagers prefer high taxes and cash transfers, while high-wagers prefer low taxes and in-kind provision. Under the empirically plausible assumption that voting participation is positively correlated with income, the equilibrium policy will be of the sort preferred by voters with above-mean income. This effect is accentuated by increased inequality.A previous version of this paper has been presented at the 2004 EPCS conference in Berlin; we thank our discussant Stanley Winer, as well as two referees of this journal, for insightful comments |
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Keywords: | Non-cooperative household Public expenditure Voting participation In-kind transfers Household production |
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