| 银行市场约束与政府监管的权衡与选择研究——对我国银行外部监管效应的论证 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄蕙.银行市场约束与政府监管的权衡与选择研究——对我国银行外部监管效应的论证[J].财经研究,2006,32(11):76-87. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄蕙 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海外国语大学,国际金融贸易学院,上海,200083 |
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| 摘 要： | 随着金融全球化和金融创新的发展,宏观系统性冲击造成了一系列银行危机。政府监管和市场约束作为银行外部监管体系的两个工具,其作用越来越受到重视。文章分析了在发生系统性冲击时如何在二者之间进行权衡和选择,从而达到最优的监管组合的效果,并针对中国的现实提出了政策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 银行 市场约束 政府监管 系统性冲击 权衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-9952（2006）11-0076-12 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-08-20 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年8月20日 |
Tradeoff and Selection between Bank Market Discipline and Government Supervision |
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| HUANG Hui.Tradeoff and Selection between Bank Market Discipline and Government Supervision[J].The Study of Finance and Economics,2006,32(11):76-87. |
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| Authors: | HUANG Hui |
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| Institution: | College of International Finance and Commerce, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai 200083, China |
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| Abstract: | With the development of financial globalization and innovation,systemic macroeconomic shock has led to a series of banking crises. As the two components of the external bank supervision system,official supervision and market discipline have received more and more attention.This paper analyzes the tradeoff and selection between the two so as to achieve an optimal supervisory combination,and puts forward suggestions for present day China. |
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| Keywords: | bank market discipline government supervision systemic shock tradeoff |
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