Stackelberg博弈下的MCP竞价上网研究

通过建立一个发电厂、电网公司和电力用户之间的三方两阶段的Stackelberg博弈模型,能够有效的考察作为电力市场领导者的发电厂的持留电量、串谋报高价等机会主义行为,并得出结论:这场以电力市场结构的拆分和重组为特点的"厂网分开,竞价上网"的电力体制改革,如果不能真正减少电力行业的垄断成本,在最终的销售电价没有受到严格规制的情况下,改革虽然有助于控制电力这个高额垄断行业的垄断利润,但是却并没有降低销售电价和提高消费者剩余,因而社会福利在一定程度上反而恶化了.

MCP Competitive Bidding in Stackelberg Games

This paper establishes a three-party,two-stage Stackelberg game model involving power plants,power grids and consumers and studies the opportunistic behavior of power plants as market leader,such as retaining electricity and collusion for higher prices.The conclusion is as follows: if the reform of separation of power plants from power grids and competitive bidding,characterized by the division and reorganization of market structure,cannot decrease the monopoly costs of the industry,without rigid regulation...