Towards a complete real-time electricity market design |
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| Authors: | Richard P. O’Neill Emily Bartholomew Fisher Benjamin F. Hobbs Ross Baldick |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First St NE, Washington, DC 20426, USA;(2) Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA;(3) California ISO Market Surveillance Committee, San Mateo, CA, USA;(4) Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA |
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| Abstract: | The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory. |
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| Keywords: | Auctions Transmission markets Market design Power system economics |
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