| 规制承诺不确定条件下的电网投资效应及其政策设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 叶泽,常新菊,龚国强.规制承诺不确定条件下的电网投资效应及其政策设计[J].中国工业经济,2006(7):73-79. |
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| 作者姓名： | 叶泽 常新菊 龚国强 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 长沙理工大学管理学院,湖南,长沙,410076
2. 中国建银投资有限责任公司,北京,100045 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文研究规制政策不确定条件下电网投资效应问题。通过对投资回报率规制政策下规制机构与电网企业的完全信息博弈模型分析．得出了电网企业和规制机构分别限制投资和改变规制政策或承诺的最优均衡解．从而得出了规制承诺或政策不确定条件下存在投资不足效应的结论。为了促进电网投资均衡，实现社会福利最大化，规制机构应该用效用函数重新定义投资均衡，将供求均衡状况因素引入投资回报率规制政策中．制定和执行弹性而可信的规制政策。
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| 关 键 词： | 投资不足 规制承诺 不确定性 政策设计 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-480X（2006）07-0073-07 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-06-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-06-12 |
Transmission Investment under Regulation Uncertainty and Policy Design |
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| YE Ze,CHANG Xin-ju,GONG Guo-qiang.Transmission Investment under Regulation Uncertainty and Policy Design[J].China Industrial Economy,2006(7):73-79. |
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| Authors: | YE Ze CHANG Xin-ju GONG Guo-qiang |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410076, China; 2. China Jianyin Investment Limited, Beijing 100045, China |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we established a transmission investment model under regulation uncertainty. Through analysis the investment strategy game model between regulator and investor, we get a conclusion that the investor will limit grid investment. In order to promote transmission investment, regulator should change the policy tools, introduce the supply and demand factor, make the utility function into the balance definition,and constitute elastic and believable policy. |
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| Keywords: | underinvestment regulation commitment uncertainty policy design |
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