Compensation for environmental services and intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of India |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Policy Studies, TERI University, 10, Institutional Area, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi 110070, India;2. Yokohama National University, 79-4, Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama 240-8501, Japan;1. Department of Liberal Arts, Indian Institute of Technology, Hyderabad, India;1. Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, 110016, India;2. International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), India;3. Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, India;1. School of Economics, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 450046, China;2. Collaborative Innovation Center of Yellow River Civilization provincial co-construction, Henan University, Kaifeng 475001, China;3. School of Politics and Public Administration, Guangxi University for Nationalities, Guangxi 530006, China;4. Henan Provincial Department of Science and Technology, Zhengzhou 450008, China;1. Chongqing Smart City Institute, Chongqing Jiaotong University, No.66 Xuefu Rd., Nan’an Dist., Chongqing 400074, China;2. State Key Laboratory of Mountain Bridge and Tunnel Engineering, Chongqing Jiaotong University, No.66 Xuefu Rd., Nan’an Dist., Chongqing 400074, China;3. School of civil engineering, Chongqing Jiaotong University, 400074, Chongqing;4. Big Data Application Center of the Chongqing Eco-environment, No. 252 Qishan Rd., Ranjiaba, Yubei District, Chongqing 401147, China;5. No.208 Hydrogeology and Engineering Geology Team of Chongqing Bureau of Geology and Minerals Exploration (Chongqing Institute of Geological Hazard Prevention Engineering Exploration and Design) |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies mechanisms to compensate local government for the public provision of environmental services using the theory of optimal fiscal transfers in India. Especially, we analyzed the role of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in achieving the environmental goal. Simply assigning the functions at appropriate levels does not ensure optimal provision of environmental services. Optimality in resource allocation could be achieved by combining the assignment system with an appropriate compensation mechanism. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers would be a suitable mechanism for compensating the local governments and help in internalizing the spillover effects of providing environmental public goods. Illustrations are also provided for India. |
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