Partial exposure in large games |
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| Institution: | 1. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208, United States;2. Department of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel;1. Paris School of Economics-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France;2. Socioeconomic Research Institute of Piedmont, Italy;3. Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy;4. European Central University, Hungary;5. Santa-Fe Institute, United States;1. School of Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK;2. Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, Faculty of Brain Sciences, University College London, London, UK;3. Department of Geriatric Medicine, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK;4. South Glos Memory Services, Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership, Bristol, UK;5. Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK;6. Department of Psychology, University of Swansea, Swansea, UK;1. Inorganic and Physical Chemistry Division, CSIR-Indian Institute of Chemical Technology, Tarnaka, Hyderabad, Telangana State – 500 007, India;2. Laboratory of X-ray Crystallography, CSIR-Indian Institute of Chemical Technology, Tarnaka, Telangana State, Hyderabad – 500 007, India;1. Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena 07745, Germany;2. Department of Economics, University of Verona, Verona 37129, Italy;3. Graduate School of Business, Deakin University, Burwood 3125, Australia;4. Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton 3800, Australia |
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| Abstract: | In this work we introduce the notion of partial exposure, in which the players of a simultaneous-move Bayesian game are exposed to the realized types and chosen actions of a subset of the other players. We show that in any large simultaneous-move game, each player has very little regret even after being partially exposed to other players. If players are given the opportunity to be exposed to others at the expense of a small decrease in utility, players will decline this opportunity, and the original Nash equilibria of the game will survive. |
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