Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, United States;2. Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, United States;3. CREED, University of Amsterdam, United States;1. Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, P.O. Box 94240, 1090 GE Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham, Sir Clive Granger Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom;3. Center for Research on Experimental Economics and political Decision-making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands;4. Famnit, University of Primorska, Glagolja?ka 8, SI-6000 Koper, Slovenia |
| |
| Abstract: | We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
