A theory of hung juries and informative voting |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, United States;2. Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States;1. University Bonn, Department of Economics, Institute for Microeconomics, Adenauer Allee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany;2. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institute for Economic Theory 1, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany;1. Department of Complex and Intelligent Systems, Future University Hakodate, Japan;2. Institute of Economic Research, Chuo University, Japan;3. Faculty of Economics, Chuo University, Japan;1. CIE and Department of Economics, ITAM, Mexico;2. Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, USA;1. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Orhanli, Tuzla, 34956, Istanbul, Turkey;2. Poole School of Management, North Carolina State University, 27695, Raleigh, NC, USA |
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| Abstract: | This paper investigates a jury decision when hung juries and retrials are possible. When jurors in subsequent trials know that previous trials resulted in hung juries, informative voting cannot be an equilibrium regardless of voting rules unless the probability that each juror receives the correct signal when the defendant is guilty is identical to the one when he is innocent. Thus, while Coughlan (2000) claims that mistrials facilitate informative voting, our result shows that such an assertion holds only in limited circumstances. |
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