Feedback,punishment and cooperation in public good experiments |
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| Institution: | 1. University of California at Santa Barbara, 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210, USA;2. University of Granada, Globe, Campus de la Cartuja s/n, E-18071, Granada, Spain;3. University of Exeter, Business School, UK;4. Middlesex University, Business School, UK;1. Economics Department, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, United States;2. Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, 401 Engineering 2 Building, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, United States;1. Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;2. Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;3. Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;4. Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA;5. Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA;6. Program in Cognitive Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA;7. School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA |
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| Abstract: | A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the efficacy of punishment. Providing subjects with information about the earnings of their peers leads to significantly less cooperation and lower efficiency compared to a treatment in which subjects receive information about the contributions of their peers. This is despite the fact that the feedback format does not affect incentives. The data suggest that this happens because the feedback format acts as a coordination device which influences the contribution standards that groups establish. |
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