| Abstract: | In late 19th century Britain it was widely accepted by leading authorities that «goodwill» was simply the purchase of sufficient expected «surplus profits» to persuade the owners of a business to part with its net assets and control, and that this expenditure should be capitalized and amortized against those surplus profits as they are realized. Although this method remains the conventional wisdom, and dominates current international regulation and practice, its conceptual foundation appears lost to modern scholars, for whom the «problem» of accounting for goodwill is «insoluble». In the first part of the paper the concepts of Marx's political economy are employed to elaborate the conventional method, which is argued to be necessary to allow the capital markets to observe the generation and realization of profit and the rate of return on capital. From this perspective, the heavily criticized decision of the UK authorities in SSAP22 to encourage the write-off of goodwill against capital is an anomaly requiring explanation. It is usually explained as either the ASC's acceptance of economic income accounting as the ideal for financial reporting, or its acquiescence to powerful managerial interests. In the second part, these explanations are criticized, and an alternative hypothesis advanced which is consistent with the limited evidence available. That, although the capital markets usually want purchased goodwill to be capitalized and amortized, in the peculiar circumstances of the UK, where unusually large portions of its manufacturing industry were closed or run down in the acquisitions and merger boom of the 1980's, writing-off purchased goodwill against capital was in the collective interest of investors because it helped to hide from public view the fact that dividends were being paid from capital. |
