首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

民间独立审计的博弈分析
引用本文:李峰,殷蓉. 民间独立审计的博弈分析[J]. 天津商学院学报, 2008, 28(6): 36-40
作者姓名:李峰  殷蓉
作者单位:中国人民大学经济学院,国家信息中心
摘    要:通过建立博弈模型,对上市公司的信息披露过程和审计人员的审计过程进行博弈分析,剖析这两种行为的主体在一定环境条件的约束下,从各自允许选择的行为策略中进行选择并加以实施的过程,深入探讨了影响审计质量的主要原因。在此基础上,进一步指出为提高审计独立性,可以从改善审计人员博弈环境、加大对违规注册会计师的惩罚力度及加快注册会计师的诚信建设三个方面入手。

关 键 词:博弈  独立  审计  上市公司

Game Analysis of Nongovernmental Auditing Independence in China
LI Feng School of Economics,Renmin University of China,Beijing ,China YIN Rong State Information Center,Beijing ,China. Game Analysis of Nongovernmental Auditing Independence in China[J]. Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce, 2008, 28(6): 36-40
Authors:LI Feng School of Economics  Renmin University of China  Beijing   China YIN Rong State Information Center  Beijing   China
Affiliation:LI Feng School of Economics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China YIN Rong State Information Center,Beijing 100045,China
Abstract:Hidden behind the auditing independence are many sharp and complex issues,all of which require our serious facing and thinking.By building the model on game theory,the paper analyses the information disclosure of listed com- panies and audit activities of auditors,indicates that the two bodies will respectively choose tactics and actions that bene-fit themselves under certain circumstances in stock market,and gives the main reasons for low audit quality.Based on the above,it offers such proposals for enhancing the independence of audit as improving the game circumstances of audi- tors,inflicting severe punishment on CPAs breaking the rules,and building up the credit of CPAs.
Keywords:game  independence  audit  listed companies
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号