| 国有企业委托代理模式博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 周杰. 国有企业委托代理模式博弈分析[J]. 经济经纬, 2008, 0(4) |
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| 作者姓名： | 周杰 |
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| 作者单位： | 华中科技大学,经济学院,湖北,武汉,430074 |
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| 摘 要： | 笔者利用博弈论中的支付矩阵模型,分别对国有企业委托代理的三种模式进行分析。笔者认为,三种模式各有其弊端。在现代企业制度下,要完善国有企业委托代理关系,可对企业家采取职位消费激励、收入报酬激励及建立声誉制度等具体措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 国有企业 博弈 |
A Game Analysis of the Principal - agent Mode of State - owned Enterprises |
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| ZHOU Jie. A Game Analysis of the Principal - agent Mode of State - owned Enterprises[J]. Economic Survey, 2008, 0(4) |
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| Authors: | ZHOU Jie |
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| Abstract: | Using the payoff matrix model of the game theory,the author analyses the three principal-agent modes of state-owned enterprises respectively.The author holds that the three modes have their respective drawbacks.In modern enterprise system,in order to perfect the principal-agent relation in state-owned enterprises,it is advisable to adopt the measures of position consumption encouragement,income reward encouragement and prestige mechanism as far as entrepreneurs are concerned. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent state-owned enterprise game |
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