Ungleichheitsaversion in Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehungen |
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| Authors: | Marion Eberlein Christian Grund |
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| Institution: | 1. Betriebswirtschaftliche Abteilung II, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universit?t Bonn, Adenauerallee 24–42, 53113, Bonn, Deutschland
2. Lehrstuhl für BWL, insb. Personalmanagement, RWTH Aachen, Templergraben 59, 52056, Aachen, Deutschland
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| Abstract: | Principal-agent theory traditionally presumes purely self-interested individuals. In recent literature, however, we have observed an increasing number of contributions, which abstain from this presumption and account for social preferences. One prominent approach in this context is inequality aversion. In this paper, we provide an introduction to inequality aversion and discuss applications and results compared to traditional principal-agent models. |
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| Keywords: | Adverse Selektion Moral hazard Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie Soziale Pr?ferenzen Turniere Ungleichheitsaversion |
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