Bank-moneylender linkage as an alternative to bank competition in rural credit markets

This paper proposes a new method in which banks and moneylenderscan link in rural credit markets. Banks and moneylenders, twoof the major lenders in rural credit markets, differ in theirinformation on borrowers and costs of funds. Due to informationconstraints, banks must deny further loans to borrowers whocannot repay a certain amount. In the linkage, these borrowersobtain loans from moneylenders, repay the banks, and have continuingaccess. We then evaluate conditions under which the linkagewould be preferred to bank competition and find that the linkagedominates for a wide range of parameters. In light of recentproposals to liberalize Indian banking, the analysis providesa cautionary note to the limits of introducing banking competitionin rural credit markets and provides an alternative.