组织冗余和独立董事制度依赖

委托代理理论认为由于所有权和经营权的分离,组织冗余会被代理人利用从而激发代理成本,并对外部监督产生正向依赖.以中国的上市公司为研究对象,本文考察了在最终控制人类型的约束条件下组织冗余和独立董事之间的依赖关系.国有公司的冗余不论和独立董事的比例还是行业专长背景都呈负相关关系,只有在非国有的上市公司中组织冗余对独立董事的行业监督表现出正向依赖的特性.这些结果表明基于组织冗余的角度,独立董事的制度安排受到所有权类型的显著影响.

Organization Redundancy and Firms' Dependence on Independent Directors

Agency theory posits that organization redundancy will only be good for managers acting as good agents and managers may engage in self-interests activities with this slack.As a result,redundancy may become a source of agency problems.This paper investigates the relationship between organization redundancy and independent directors in China stock market.We find that organization redundancy is positively related to independent directors' industrial expertise with non-state-owned firms.However,for state-owned enterprises,significant negative relationship is observed.This shows that ownership has significant effect on organization redundancy in China capital market.