| 风险投资中的委托代理问题探讨 |
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| 引用本文： | 张宏霞,陈泉.风险投资中的委托代理问题探讨[J].黑龙江对外经贸,2011(11):47-49. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张宏霞 陈泉 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 辽宁对外经贸学院,辽宁大连,116023
2. 大连海融高新创业投资有限公司,辽宁大连,116023 |
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| 摘 要： | 逆向选择和道德风险在投资过程中产生的原因是风险投资公司与风险企业两大交易体之间的不对称信息分布,通过深入分析逆向选择和道德风险在风险投资项目选择中的形成原理与过程,区分两类道德风险存在的问题,以期为完善委托代理理论奠定理论基础。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资 道德风险 逆向选择 委托代理 |
A Discussion on Care Agency in Venture Capital |
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| Zhang Hongxia,Chen Quan.A Discussion on Care Agency in Venture Capital[J].Heilongjiang Foreign Economic Relations and Trade,2011(11):47-49. |
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| Authors: | Zhang Hongxia Chen Quan |
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| Institution: | Zhang Hongxia,Chen Quan |
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| Abstract: | The investing of Venture Capital with mathematical model and supply-demand curve.It is caused by asymmetrical distribution of information between Venture Capital corporation and venture business in terms of our studies.Furthermore,we differentiate two kinds of moral hazardwhich could be raised by different reasons.At the last,we discusse how to design feasible mechanism to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard and resolve these problems. |
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| Keywords: | venture capital moral risk adverse selection principal-agent |
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