Fairness, errors and the power of competition |
| |
Authors: | Urs Fischbacher Christina M. Fong Ernst Fehr |
| |
Affiliation: | aDepartment of Economics, University of Konstanz, Box D-131, D-78457 Konstanz, Germany;bDepartment of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA;cInstitute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland |
| |
Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate the effects of competition on bargained outcomes. We show that the neglect of either fairness concerns or decision errors will prevent a satisfactory understanding of how competition affects bargaining. We conducted experiments which demonstrate that introducing a small amount of competition to a bilateral ultimatum game – by adding just one competitor – induces large behavioral changes among responders and proposers, causing large changes in accepted offers. Models that assume that all people are self-interested and fully rational do not adequately explain these changes. We show that a model which combines heterogeneous fairness concerns with decision errors correctly predicts the comparative static effects of changes in competition. Moreover, the combined model is remarkably good at predicting the entire distribution of offers in many different competitive situations. |
| |
Keywords: | Competition Fairness Reciprocity Quantal response equilibrium |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|