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On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure
Authors:Dominique Lepelley  Fabrice Valognes
Institution:(1) /C.R.E.M.E., Université de Caen, 14032 Caen Cedex, France
Abstract:We study in this paper some features of a new voting rule recently proposed by K.H. Kim and F.W. Roush. The (conjectural) optimality of this voting rule with respect to statistical manipulability by coalitions is discussed under two alternative probabilistic assumptions, namely the impartial culture condition (IC) and the impartial anonymous culture condition (IAC). We also analyze the ability of Kim and Roush procedure to fulfil the Condorcet conditions. Some representations of its Condorcet efficiency in three-alternative elections are obtained.
Keywords:social choice  voting rules  manipulability  condorcet efficiency
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