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商业银行面临企业信用风险的进化博弈分析
引用本文:王立平.商业银行面临企业信用风险的进化博弈分析[J].华东经济管理,2004,18(1):143-145.
作者姓名:王立平
作者单位:合肥工业大学,人文经济学院,安徽,合肥,230009
摘    要:本文根据进化博弈理论,运用复制动态方程对商业银行面临企业的经营风险和道德风险进行了深入分析,对于有限理性的经济人来说,进化博弈的最终结果是令人失望的,市场几乎是完全失败的。但是,银行可以通过建立长期稳定的银企相互信任的业务关系和组建银企集团,实现商业银行与企业

关 键 词:进化博弈    复制动态方程    经营风险    道德风险
文章编号:1007-5097(2004)01-0143-03
收稿时间:2003/11/5 0:00:00
修稿时间:2003年11月5日

Analysing of evolution game on credit venture of commercial bank facing with corporation
WANG Li-ping.Analysing of evolution game on credit venture of commercial bank facing with corporation[J].East China Economic Management,2004,18(1):143-145.
Authors:WANG Li-ping
Institution:School of Humanities and Economics,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China)
Abstract:Based on the theory of evolution game,the paper analyzes thoroughly corporations' management venture and moral venture that commercial banks are confronted with by using replicated dynamic equation,and the final result of evolution game is disappointing that market is almost absolutely frustrated speaking about the economic agent of limited sense.But banks may evade venture,realize the double win of the both sides of banks and corporations and achieve Pareto optimum in the whole society by establishing the long-term steady operation relationship of trust between banks and corporations and by setting up the group of banks and corporations.
Keywords:evolution game  replicated dynamic equation  management venture  moral risk
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