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外汇储备注资国有银行效应分析
引用本文:李红坤. 外汇储备注资国有银行效应分析[J]. 山西财经大学学报, 2005, 27(6): 102-107
作者姓名:李红坤
作者单位:浙江大学,经济学院,浙江,杭州,310027
摘    要:中国银行业的风险主要起源于“道德风险”,这是国有制固有的缺陷。政府所采用的正在对国有银行进行改革的策略,主要就是针对这个问题,但是却选择了一条错误的道路。因为政府仍然控制着银行的所有权,没有迹象显示资本重定和公开上市能够导致银行治理结构稳健发展。而且,为了加速资本重定过程,改革者对国有银行注入大量外汇储备,这样做的结果造成货币供给膨胀并导致未来经济增长不稳定。

关 键 词:外汇储备  注资  道德风险
文章编号:1007-9556(2005)06-0102-06
修稿时间:2005-10-10

A Review on the Effect of Capital Injection for State-owned Banks
LI Hong-kun. A Review on the Effect of Capital Injection for State-owned Banks[J]. Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University, 2005, 27(6): 102-107
Authors:LI Hong-kun
Abstract:Banking risks in China are mainly driven by moral hazard rooted in state ownership defects in corporate governance.The ongoing reform strategy for State-owned banks adopted by the government aims at the right target,but fails to follow a right rout.Given that the government continues to hold the control on the banks,there is no to see that recapitalization and IPO will lead to sound practices for banking governance.Furthermore,in order to accelerate recapitalization,the reformers injected too much foreign exchange reserve into Stated-owned bank system,consequently expanding money supply and giving rise to the instability of the future economy.
Keywords:foreign exchange reserve  capital injection  moral hazard
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