我国中央、地方政府区域调控的利益博弈分析

地方政府与中央政府的区域经济利益博弈是市场化改革进程中的必然产物。在分权化改革与市场化改革交互作用的体制变革时期 ,以政策调整为主要手段的中央与地方之间的利益关系有其必然性及制度性缺陷。中央与地方之间的非合作利益博弈还会持续较长时间 ,要从根本制度上减少和解决二者之间的非合作博弈行为 ,就必须进行体制创新 ,加快市场经济体制建设的步伐。

Game Analysis of Regional Control Interest between China''''s Central and Local Government

The game of regional economic interest between China's central and local governments is an inevitable outcome in the course of marketization reform. In the institutional change of interactive functions between decentralization reform and marketization reform, the policy that regulates interest relationship between the central and local governments has its own inevitability and systematic shortcomings, but the game will exist for a long time. To resolve the non-cooperative game behavior, it is necessary to carry out institutional innovation and quicken the reform of market economy.