Constitutions and the resource curse |
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Authors: | J rgen Juel Andersen,Silje Aslaksen |
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Affiliation: | aNorwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU, Department of Economics, Dragvoll, NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway |
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Abstract: | Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so. |
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Keywords: | Growth Political economy Constitution Resource curse Institutions |
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