火车票定价与社会福利

一般认为火车票市场之所以存在“倒票”都是因为价格管制的结果。价格管制导致了市场中存在套利机会,但是本文应用一个动态博弈模型论证了:对于火车票这种特殊商品,即使价格升高到供求均衡价格,依然可能存在套利机会;单纯地提高价格不仅不能消除“倒票”行为,而且损害了低收入消费者的福利。本文提出了一种差别定价方式———两期定价方法,可以驱逐市场中的“套利者”;同时,恰当的两期定价还可增进社会福利。

Railroad Ticket Pricing and Social Welfare

It is generally believed that the scalping of railroad ticket originates from price regulation because there are arbitrage opportunities when ticket price is lower than the equilibrium level.This paper,however,shows that arbitrage opportunities still exist even in a market with equilibrium ticket price under certain circumstances.Raising ticket price is not only helpless to restrain scalping but also harmful to low-income consumers' welfare.We developed a two-period ticket pricing model which is not only effective on restraining scalping but also favorable to social welfare.