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Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis
Authors:Mark A. Cohen  V. Santhakumar
Affiliation:(1) Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203, USA;(2) Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, 695011, Kerala, India
Abstract:Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation – mandatory disclosure of information. While information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior – often resulting in lower levels of pollution – little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome a lack of information on the part of the public. We characterize the conditions under which information disclosure will lead to a reduction in emissions, and ultimately, the conditions under which it will enhance social welfare. Several extensions of the model are briefly explored, including the effect of two sources of pollution – only one of which is subject to information disclosure. This paper was prepared while V. Santhakumar was a Visiting Scholar at the Vanderbilt Center for Environmental Management Studies, Vanderbilt University.
Keywords:information disclosure  environmental regulation  Coase theorem  asymmetric information
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