基于模糊多属性决策的国有企业拍卖机制设计

国有企业拍卖决策机制属于模糊多属性、多轮次决策范畴,运用模糊多属性决策分析工具与拍卖理论相结合的研究思路,设计了国有企业的拍卖规程。研究认为,国有企业所有人虚位及其叠加式代理的特征使国有资产管理人或经理人在并购谈判中容易诱发寻租,以拍卖成交价格为主体的多属性拍卖是国有资产安全、有效的交易方式。同时,在拍卖方式选择上第二价格密封拍卖方式较为适当,最利于实现国有企业拍卖绩效,而通常采用的升价拍卖方式应该慎用。

Design of Auction Mechanism of State-Owned Enterprises Based on Multi-Attribute Decision-Making

The decision-making mechanism of auction of state-owned enterprises is fuzzy attribute with multi rounds. With the analysis tools for fuzzy, multi-attribute decision making and auction theories, the study designed a regulation for the auction of state-owned enter-prises. It believes that as the owners of state-owned enterprises are vacant in reality and the agent is a type of superposition, it is easy to induce rent-seeking for administrators or managers of state-owned asset in merger discussions. In this connection, multi-attribute auc-tions based on transaction price is a safe and efficient way of transaction of state-owned assets. In addition, second price sealed auction is an appropriate approach because it is the most conducive in realizing state-owned enterprises auction performance, while the prevailing ascending price auction method should be used with caution.