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Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
Institution:1. Department of Nephrology & Rheumatology, Shanghai Tenth People''s Hospital, Tongji University School of Medicine, Shanghai, China;2. Department of Biomedical Engineering, University of Houston, 3605 Cullen Blvd, Room 2018, Houston, TX 77204, USA
Abstract:We develop econometric models of ascending (English) auctions which allow for both bidder asymmetries as well as common and/or private value components in bidders’ underlying valuations. We show that the equilibrium inverse bid functions in each round of the auction are implicitly defined (pointwise) by a system of nonlinear equations, so that conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an increasing-strategy equilibrium are essentially identical to those which ensure a unique and increasing solution to the system of equations. We exploit the computational tractability of this characterization in order to develop an econometric model, thus extending the literature on structural estimation of auction models. Finally, an empirical example illustrates how equilibrium learning affects bidding during the course of the auction.
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