Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit,governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Bioengineering Research Laboratory, Roth McFarlane Hand and Upper Limb Center, St. Joseph’s Health Care, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada;2. Department of Mechanical Engineering, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY;1. Center for Surgery and Public Health, Department of Surgery, Brigham & Women''s Hospital, Boston, MA;2. Division of Trauma, Burns and Surgical Critical Care, Department of Surgery, Brigham & Women''s Hospital, Boston, MA;3. Department of Medicine, Brigham & Women''s Hospital, Boston, MA;4. Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA;5. Department of Medicine, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA;6. Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA;1. Department of Computer Science and Information Systems, University of Wisconsin–River Falls, River Falls, WI 54022, USA;2. Department of Computer Science and Computer Engineering, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA;3. Department of Computer Science, University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh, Oshkosh, WI 54901, USA;1. Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, IN, USA;2. The Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, Beijing, China;3. University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA;4. Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, USA;5. Department of Energy Economics, School of Economics, Renmin University of China, China;6. Beijing Jiaotong University and Beijing Transport Institute, China;1. Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV, Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), Rua Itapeva, 474, 12 andar, 01332-000, Sao Paulo, Brazil;2. Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), SBS Quadra 01 Bloco J Sala 303, 70076-900, Brasilia, Brazil |
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| Abstract: | Studies of mixed industries frequently focus on differential behavior between for-profit and either nonprofit or governmental producers. Substantially less is known about differences among governmental, religious nonprofit, and secular nonprofit organizations. We examine the compensation of hospital CEOs to assess the extent to which these three organizational forms pursue similar objectives. Compensation levels, the use of salaries versus bonuses as proxies for weak versus strong incentives, and the criteria organizations use to determine bonuses are analyzed. We conclude that the CEO incentive contracts at religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and governmental hospitals imply substantive differences in the behavior of these organizations. |
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