Voting under ignorance of job skills of unemployed: the overtaxation bias |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Decision Sciences, IGIER and BIDSA, Bocconi, Italy;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, United Kingdom;3. Department of Economics, University of Essex, United Kingdom |
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Abstract: | Usual models on voting over basic income–flat tax schedules rest on the assumption that voters know the whole distribution of skills even if at equilibrium some individuals do not work. If individuals’ productivity remains unknown until they work, it may be more convincing to assume that voters have only beliefs about the distribution of skills and that a learning process takes place. In this paper, at each period, individuals vote according to their beliefs which are updated when getting new information from the job market. The voting process converges towards some steady-state equilibrium that depends on both the true distribution of skills and the initial beliefs. The equilibrium tax rate is higher than (or equal to) the tax rate achieved in the perfect information framework. An illustration is provided on French data: if voters are over-pessimistic as to the potential productivity of unemployed people, majority voting may lock the economy in an “informational trap” with a high tax rate and a high level of inactivity. |
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