The interaction of incentives and information disclosure: the case of confidence interval information |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Information and Communication Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, Sichuan, PR China;2. School of Aerospace, Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering, RMIT University, Victoria 3083, Australia;3. Institute of Electronics, Chinese Academy of Sciences.;1. Rangeland Management Specialist;2. Rangeland Technician from the US Department of Agriculture/Agricultural Research Service Fort Keogh Livestock and Range Research Laboratory, Miles City, MT 59301, USA;1. Key Laboratory of Arable Land Conservation (Middle and Lower Reaches of Yangtze River), Ministry of Agriculture, College of Resources and Environment, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan 430070, China;2. Physical Chemistry and Soft Matter, Wageningen University, Dreijenplein 6, 6703 HB Wageningen, The Netherlands;3. Beijing Synchrotron Radiation Facility, Institute of High Energy Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100039, China;4. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Environmental Chemistry and Technology Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706, United States |
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| Abstract: | Reliable risk assessment is critical for success in decision-making, but our assessment of risk is often hindered by inherent biases and limitations in our information processing capacities. Consequently, many have presumed that the disclosure of probabilistic or confidence interval (CI) information would aid our judgment of the uncertainty of an estimate. Empirical support for CI information disclosure, however, is generally lacking. Since human beings are goal-directed, the effectiveness of CI information disclosure may be contingent upon the motivation of an individual. This study, through a computer-based laboratory experiment, examines whether the effectiveness of CI information disclosure in an investment choice task setting is contingent upon the availability of performance-based monetary incentives. The results indicate that the disclosure of CI information can enhance or harm decision performance contingent upon the incentive condition: incentives are vital for realizing benefits from the disclosure of CI information. The implications of the findings are discussed. |
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