Reputation with observed actions |
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Authors: | Marco Celentani |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, E-28903 Getafe (Madrid), Spain |
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Abstract: | Summary A single long-run player plays a fixed stage game (simultaneous orsequential move) against an infinite sequence of short-run opponents that play only once but can observe all past realized actions. Assuming that the probability distributions over types of long and short-run players have full support, we show that the long-run player can always establish a reputation for theStackelberg strategy and is therefore guaranteed almost his Stackelberg payoff in all Nash equilibria of the repeated game.The financial support of the National Science Foundation, Grant SES 90-7999, and of Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank David Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Seminar Participants at UCLA, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and University of Naples for useful discussions and suggestions. |
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Keywords: | Repeated games reputation Nash equilibrium |
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