| 剩余控制权配置与家族企业继任冲突——香港新鸿基地产控制权争夺事件的案例研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱沆,陈文婷,刘佳. 剩余控制权配置与家族企业继任冲突——香港新鸿基地产控制权争夺事件的案例研究[J]. 管理案例研究与评论, 2011, 4(1): 1-13 |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱沆 陈文婷 刘佳 |
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| 作者单位： | 朱沆,ZHU Hang(中山大学管理学院,广州,510275;中山大学港澳珠江三角洲研究中心,广州,510275;东北财经大学工商管理学院,辽宁,大连,116023);陈文婷,刘佳,GHEN Wen-ting,LIU Jia(东北财经大学工商管理学院,辽宁,大连,116023;中山大学中国家族企业研究中心,辽宁,大连,116023) |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金重点项目，国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号70872118;71072093).教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目，广东省高等学校珠江学者计划项目的支持 |
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| 摘 要： | 华人社会盛行的诸子析产制是代际传承中分裂家族和家族企业的根本原因吗?本文通过剖析香港新鸿基地产控制权争夺事件的案例发现,在代际传承过程中分离剩余索取权和控制权,集中配置剩余控制权并未根本解决上述问题,原因在于这种产权安排造成了控制权与剩余索取权的不对称,甚至控制权反向控制剩余控制权的情况,在代际传承导致家族原有内部治理...
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| 关 键 词： | 剩余控制权 代际传承 内部代理问题 |
Residual Control Deployment and Succession Conflicts in Family Businesses:Case Study on Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. |
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| ZHU Hang,GHEN Wen-ting,LIU Jia. Residual Control Deployment and Succession Conflicts in Family Businesses:Case Study on Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd.[J]. Journal of Management Case Studies, 2011, 4(1): 1-13 |
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| Authors: | ZHU Hang GHEN Wen-ting LIU Jia |
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| Affiliation: | ZHU Hang1,2,3,CHEN Wen-ting3,4,LIU Jia3,4(1.School of Business,Sun Yat-Sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China,2.Hong Kong,Macao and Pearl River Delta Research Center,Sun Yat-sen University,3.School of Business Management,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116023,4.Research Center for Chinese Family Businesses,China) |
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| Abstract: | Is it because of the tradition of properties division in Chinese community that family disruption and disintegration occur in family business for trans-generational succession？ Through the case study of Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. and Kwok family （Hong Kong）, we found that even if the Kwok family separated their residual claim and residual control, and concentrated their residual control by setting up family trust fund, it had not avoided the above problem. However, this arrangement brought the asymmetry between residual claim and residual control, and the result of reverse control-residual control controlled by management control. Under the background that family internal governance lost effect and corporate governance couldn＇t provide protection, this property arrangement may induce internal agency problem easily. The result suggests that it is the internal agency problem emerging in trans-generational succession that results in family disruption and disintegration of family business, and to avoid these problems the institutionalized governance structure should be developed in family. |
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| Keywords: | residual control trans-generational succession internal agency problem |
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