首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Monitoring by Affiliated Bankers on Board of Directors: Evidence from Corporate Financing Outcomes
Authors:Elif Sisli‐Ciamarra
Institution:Elif Sisli‐Ciamarra is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Brandeis International Business School in Waltham, MA.
Abstract:Using a hand‐collected data set on boards of directors of large US nonfinancial companies, this paper investigates the effects of the presence of a creditor on a company's board. The results suggest that the presence of a creditor: 1) increases the amount of debt in a company's capital structure via an increase in private debt, 2) decreases the sensitivity of debt financing to the amount of tangible assets that a company holds, 3) decreases the cost of borrowing, and 4) reduces the pledge of collateral and financial covenants in debt contracts.
Keywords:
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号