| 大股东资金占用、外部审计与公司治理 |
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| 引用本文： | 杜兴强,郭剑花,雷宇. 大股东资金占用、外部审计与公司治理[J]. 经济管理, 2010, 0(1) |
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| 作者姓名： | 杜兴强 郭剑花 雷宇 |
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| 作者单位： | 厦门大学管理学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金“会计准则、会计信息质量与会计信息的契约有用性研究”(07CJY010) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文实证检验独立审计能否对大股东资金占用起到抑制作用。鉴于大股东资金占用与审计师选择之间的相互影响,本文采用联系方程模型对内生性予以控制。本文研究发现,高质量审计能够显著抑制上市公司大股东资金占用。但是,大股东资金占用越严重的公司,并不一定会选择高质量审计,表明中国资本市场目前尚缺乏对高质量审计的需求。
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| 关 键 词： | 大股东资金占用 掏空 外部审计 公司治理 |
Controlling Shareholders' Cash Embezzlement,External Auditing and Corporate Governance |
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| DU Xing-qiang,GUO Jian-hua,LEI-Yu. Controlling Shareholders' Cash Embezzlement,External Auditing and Corporate Governance[J]. Economic Management, 2010, 0(1) |
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| Authors: | DU Xing-qiang GUO Jian-hua LEI-Yu |
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| Affiliation: | DU Xing-qiang,GUO Jian-hua,LEI-Yu (School of Manangement,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian,361005,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the mannual data in Chinese A-share stock market and corporate governance index(CGI), the paper examines whether auditing can restrain the controlling shareholders' cash embezzlement(CSCE) as an external governance mechanism of firms.Due to the interaction between CSCE and auditor choice,this paper adopts simultaneous equations to control the endogeneity.Results confirm that high quality auditors can significantly restrain the controlling shareholders' cash embezzlement.However,the listed firms in ... |
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| Keywords: | controlling shareholders' cash embezzlement tunneling external auditing corporate governance |
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