基于博弈均衡的中小企业融资契约安排

融资难是制约我国中小企业发展的瓶颈,也是摆在广大研究工作者面前的重大课题。本文从关系专用性投资的视角,考察了中小企业对融资关系的处理以及融资契约的安排,通过数学建模检验了静态博弈的非效率性,以及动态博弈下不同融资模式的子博弈完美纳什均衡的参与约束条件,进而为解决我国中小企业融资难问题提出了政策性建议。

On the Financing Contract Arrangement of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises(SMEs)Based on the Game Equilibrium

Financing difficulty,the major problem of small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) in our country, has become the bottleneck restraining their development.From the perspective of relationship-specific investment, this paper explores how SMEs deal with financing relationships and arrange financirlg contracts,and furthermore it tests the non-efficiency of static game,and the individual participation constraint conditions of the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of diverse financing models of dynamic game through mathematical modeling. Finally the paper puts forward some strategic suggestions in order to solve the financing problem for the Chinese SMEs.