| 建筑工程项目业主与监理的信息不对称分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 槐先锋,王晓蕾. 建筑工程项目业主与监理的信息不对称分析[J]. 建筑管理现代化, 2004, 0(5): 45-47 |
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| 作者姓名： | 槐先锋 王晓蕾 |
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| 作者单位： | 华北水利水电学院,河南,郑州,450008;华北水利水电学院,河南,郑州,450008 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用委托——代理理论，对工程建设市场上业主与监理之间的信息不对称问题进行了分析，以完善建筑工程项目监理制度，在此基础上，提出了解决招投标阶段和合同履约阶段信息不对称问题的办法。
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| 关 键 词： | 工程项目 建设监理 信息不对称 逆向选择 道德风险 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-019X(2004)05-0045-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-08-25 |
Analysis of Information Asymmetry between Client and Supervision in Construction Engineering Project |
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| HUAI Xian-feng,WANG Xiao-lei. Analysis of Information Asymmetry between Client and Supervision in Construction Engineering Project[J]. Construction Management Modernization, 2004, 0(5): 45-47 |
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| Authors: | HUAI Xian-feng WANG Xiao-lei |
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| Abstract: | Principal agent-theory is used in the paper to analyze asymmetry information between client and supervision in engineering construction market, based on which the method is proposed to settle information asymmetry during the period of bidding and invitation for bid and contract performing. |
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| Keywords: | construction project engineering supervision information asymmetry adverse selection moral hazard |
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