| 基于航运系统的承运人合作演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘聪,江志斌,肖斌,孟峰. 基于航运系统的承运人合作演化博弈分析[J]. 上海管理科学, 2011, 33(4): 56-62 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘聪 江志斌 肖斌 孟峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海交通大学中美物流研究院,上海,200240
2. 上海交通大学机械与动力工程学院,上海,200240 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目-香港研究资助局联合资助项目（70831160527）;国家自然科学基金项目（70872077）. |
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| 摘 要： | 本文运用演化博弈理论研究了航运业中承运人群体之间的合作行为。研究表明，当没有监控机制存在时，航运业承运人群体之间的合作将是无效的。在航运旺季时，承运人之间存在合作和不合作的演化均衡，在航运淡季时，承运人之间出现双方都不合作的演化均衡。然而，当航运区域的枢纽港充当监控平台时，在航运旺季和航运淡季时，对承运人群体合作和背叛行为给与不同范围的激励和补偿，将使承运人之间出现高效的合作演化均衡。研究结果对区域航运业有一定的借鉴作用。
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| 关 键 词： | 航运系统 演化博弈 复制动态 进化稳定策略 |
Evolutionary game model based on cooperation between the carriers in shipping industry |
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| Liu Cong,Jiang Zhi-bin,Xiao Bin,Meng Feng. Evolutionary game model based on cooperation between the carriers in shipping industry[J]. Shanghai Managent Science, 2011, 33(4): 56-62 |
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| Authors: | Liu Cong Jiang Zhi-bin Xiao Bin Meng Feng |
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| Affiliation: | Liu Cong Jiang Zhi-bin Xiao Bin Meng Feng |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we study the cooperation between the carriers in shipping industry based on evolutionary game model. It is proved that the carriers have inefficient behavior without the supervision mechanism. There is equilibrium which is cooperation versus non-cooperation between the carriers in high season of transportation, while there is equilibrium of non-cooperation versus non-cooperation between the carriers in low season of transportation. However, the cooperation equilibrium will be formed by the establishment of the supervision mechanism. The conclusion of this paper is important and useful to the operation of shipping industry. |
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| Keywords: | Shipping system Evolutionary game Replicator dynamics Evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） |
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