首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

农业保险属性与政府补贴理论探析
引用本文:费友海. 农业保险属性与政府补贴理论探析[J]. 广东金融学院学报, 2006, 21(3): 75-79
作者姓名:费友海
作者单位:西南财经大学,保险学院,成都,610074
摘    要:作为准公共物品的农业保险的外部性导致市场机制不能对农业保险资源进行有效配置,保障农业保险的有效供求,从而导致我国农业保险目前的发展困境。农业保险市场机制失灵为政府干预,建立政府补贴型的政策型农业保险制度提供了理论依据,但过度的政府干预和高额政策补贴不仅不能解决市场失灵,反而会产生一系列的负面效应,扭曲市场机制的资源配置功能,降低资源配置效率。因而单纯地依靠市场机制的自发作用或政府干预都不能有效解决目前我国农业保险所面临的问题,关键还在于能否有效地把市场调节和政府干预有机地结合起来,合理界定两者的关系,使二者能达到最优配置,更加公平并富有效率。

关 键 词:农业保险  准公共产品  外部性  政策性补贴

The Character of Agricultural Insurance and the Theory of Police Subsidy
Fei Youhai. The Character of Agricultural Insurance and the Theory of Police Subsidy[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance, 2006, 21(3): 75-79
Authors:Fei Youhai
Abstract:As quasi-public goods,the external effect of the agricultural insurance cause the failure of the market mechanism,can't guarantee the valid supply and need of the agricultural insurance,thus cause the currently predicament situation of agricultural insurance.The failure of the market provide the theories basis for the government intervention and establishing the policy subsidy type of the agricultural insurance system,but excessive government intervention with high policy subsidy not only can't resolve the failure of the market,on the contrary would produce a series of negative effect,distort the resources installing function of the market mechanism.As result depending on the function of the market or the government interventions singly can't resolve the current problem of the agricultural insurance effectively,the key to solving the problem still is how to integrate the market mechanism with the government intervention organically,deal with the interaction of them.
Keywords:Agricultural Insurance  Quasi-public Goods  External Effect  Policy Subsidy  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号