基于博弈论的企业激励制度分析——从经济学视角看“不能让老实人吃亏”

将制度定义为博弈的规则,应用现代博弈论的方法论证了企业为什么不能让老实人吃亏,并探讨了企业有效激励制度的设计思路。本文引入新制度经济学人的有限理性假设,建立一个有限博弈方的进化博弈模型,证明了如果不能从制度上保证不让老实人吃亏,具有机会主义行为倾向的员工在重复博弈之后最终都将选择偷懒。并分两种情况分析了企业如何设计有效的激励制度,从而从制度上保证不让老实人吃亏。

The Design of Incentive Institutions Based on Game Theory --How to Reward Honest Behavior

The institutions are defined as the rules of the Game. The article demonstrates why the honest behavior in the firm should be awarded, and discusses the approach to design incentive institutions effectively. We put forward the hypothesis of neo-institutional economics--economic man of bounded rationality, then prove through a evolutional stable strategy game model that honest behavior must be awarded otherwise all players in the game will choose cheating after repeated games, at last analyze how to design incentive institutions effectively under two situations.