流域水环境综合治理PPP项目风险的次优分配与致因探析

流域水环境综合治理PPP项目是我国开展水环境治理工作的重要抓手,此类项目投资大、系统性强,因此政府方与社会资本方对风险的合理分担尤为重要。针对流域水环境综合治理PPP项目在公共部门和社会资本方之间的风险分配问题,利用文献统计识别此类项目的共担风险因素,通过专家问卷调查分析风险分担现状,基于博弈论思想探讨次优分配的致因机制,并提出相关建议。研究结果表明:目前流域水环境综合治理PPP实践中存在风险次优分配现象,政府方承担的风险比例偏低；费用支付和项目需求程度两项风险最为重要但风险分配却极不合理；双方谈判地位与风险承担能力不匹配导致次优分配,政府方与社会资本方之间同时存在利益冲突与合作关系,而信息不对称加剧了双方在利益冲突下的非合作博弈。提出了优化费用支付和项目需求程度的风险分担结构及明确风险传导机制的建议。

Analysis on the sub-optimal allocation and causes of river basin water environment comprehensive treatment PPP project

The comprehensive treatment of water environment in river basin PPP project is an important starting point for China to carry out water environment management. Such projects have large investment and strong systematicness, so reasonable risk sharing between government and social capital it is very important. This paper focuses on the risk allocation issues between the public sector and the social capital for the PPP project of comprehensive management of water environment in river basin. Firstly, the risk sharing factors of such projects are identified through literature statistics, and then the current situation of risk sharing is analyzed through expert questionnaire survey. Finally, the cause mechanism of sub-optimal allocation is discussed based on game theory and relevant suggestions are put forward. The results show that there is a phenomenon of sub-optimal risk allocation in the practice of the comprehensive management of water environment in river basin PPP projects. The proportion of risks borne by the government is low, especially the two most important risks, namely, the cost payment and the degree of project demand, but the risk allocation is extremely unreasonable. The mismatch between the negotiation status and the risk bearing capacity of both parties will lead to the phenomenon of sub-optimal distribution, and the information asymmetry aggravates the non-cooperative game between the two parties under the conflict of interest.