退耕还林中的目标传递与政府行为选择

对于造林目标选择、传递、演进提供解释框架,分析地方政府在政策执行中可能的偏差及来源。通过建立双任务委托——代理模型,证明人工林质量降低主要来自于工程实施中的激励不相容。通过地方政府禀赋价值与市场价格变动的分析,提出林业产品市场价格波动、科技收益的不确定性以及质量标准的模糊使工资契约出现了激励不相容,弱化了地方政府造林质量努力的动机。对建立活立木市场、推行生态购买等提出了政策建议,以期提高退耕还林工程的生态效益。

Goal Transcending & Governmental Behavior Selection in the Conversion Program from Cropland to Forestry Land

This paper sets up a scheme to explain the goal selection,transcending and evolution of the central & local governments,which explains the possible distortion and sources of local governments′policy implementation.Within the framework of dual-task principle-agent model,this paper holds that the lower quality of man-made forestry mainly due to incentive-incompatibility existing in the enforcement of the cropland conversion program.This paper suggests that 3 factors,such as market value fluctuation of forestry products,uncertainty of sci-technology income,and inaccuracy of quality standard,should make wade wage contract incentive-incompatibility,which may weaken the quality action mode of local government.A serial of public regulation scheme such as instituting live lot market,developing ecological purchase are proposed in the hope that they can be used to improve ecological efficiency of the program.