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Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for retail services
Authors:Matthias Hunold  Johannes Muthers
Affiliation:1. Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) at the Heinrich Heine Universit?t Düsseldorf;2. Julius‐Maximilians‐Universit?t Würzburg
Abstract:We investigate the incentives of two manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). Retailers provide product‐specific services that increase demand and manufacturers use minimum RPM to compete for favorable retail services for their products. Minimum RPM increases consumer prices and can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even reducing, the overall level of retail services. If manufacturer market power is asymmetric, minimum RPM may distort the allocation of services toward the high‐priced products of the manufacturer with more market power. These results challenge the service argument as an efficiency defense for minimum RPM.
Keywords:
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