| 基于委托-代理理论分析经济适用房开发商的行为选择 |
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| 引用本文： | 马光红.基于委托-代理理论分析经济适用房开发商的行为选择[J].建筑管理现代化,2006(5):35-38. |
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| 作者姓名： | 马光红 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海大学,房地产学院,上海,201702 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于委托—代理理论，分析了经济适用虏开发商的行为选择。通过分析表明，在政府监控主体缺失的情况下，开发商所选择的占优策略是违规开发。因此，为避免道德风险问题，政府主管部门应当通过制定权利和义务、责任和利益相制衡的竞争和激励约束机制，将委托人的风险不同程度的转为代理人的风险，从而规范开发商的行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理理论 经济适用房 福利倒置 激励相容 约束机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-019X(2006)05-0035-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 06 27 2006 12:00AM |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年6月27日 |
The Action Selection of Real Estate Enterprise Based on the Principal-Agent Theory |
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| MA Guang-hong.The Action Selection of Real Estate Enterprise Based on the Principal-Agent Theory[J].Construction Management Modernization,2006(5):35-38. |
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| Authors: | MA Guang-hong |
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| Institution: | Shanghai University, Shanghai 201702, China |
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| Abstract: | Based on the principal-agent theory, the paper analyses the action selection of real estate enterprises. By means of analyzing, the real estate enterprises breach the government subsidy provisions without the efficient supervision. To avoid the moral hazard problem, government competent department should establish competitive and incentive equilibrium constraint mechanism of right and obligation. In order to control the real estate enterprises, the government competent department should convert the principal risk to the agent risk in different degrees. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent theory economic affordable housing benefits up-down incentive compatibility constraint mechanism |
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