Mechanism design with partial state verifiability |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, UK;1. Department of Decision Sciences and IGIER, Università Bocconi, Via Röntgen, 1, 20136 Milano, Italy;2. School of Business, University of Washington Bothell, 18115 Campus Way NE, Bothell, WA 98011, USA;3. Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA;1. Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, United States;2. Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, United States;1. Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, United States;2. Department of Economics, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, United States;1. University of Alicante, Spain;2. University of Chile, Chile |
| |
| Abstract: | We study implementation in environments where agents have limited ability to imitate others. Agents are randomly and privately endowed with type-dependent sets of messages. So sending a message becomes a partial proof regarding type. For environments where agents can send any combination of available messages, we develop an Extended Revelation Principle and characterize the incentive constraints which implementable allocations must satisfy. When not all message combinations are feasible, static mechanisms no longer suffice. If a ‘punishment’ allocation exists for each agent, then implementable allocations can be characterized as equilibria of a “Revelation Game,” in which agents first select from the menus of allocation rules, then the mediator requests each agent to send some verifying messages. When a punishment allocation fails to exist for some agent, dynamic games in which agents gradually reveal their evidence implement a larger set of outcomes. The latter result provides a foundation for a theory of debate. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
