Strategic manipulation of a pollution permit market and international trade |
| |
Authors: | Julien Bueb Sonia Schwartz |
| |
Affiliation: | 1.CRESE, Besan?on University,Besan?on cedex,France;2.GREQAM, Aix-Marseille University, Espace Forbin,Aix en Provence,France |
| |
Abstract: | We consider a framework where firms which compete in an international product market are not all submitted to a pollution permit market. Using the Brander and Spencer’s framework (J Int Econ 18:83–100, 1985), we seek to determine the optimal strategies of both a dominant firm in the pollution permit market and the regulator in a such context. We first show that the dominant firm pursues a strategic manipulation to increase its profit. We also find that the regulator uses a sophisticated strategic policy to increase the domestic welfare by using two instruments: the initial allocation of pollution permits and the pollution cap. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|